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Abstract
Coordination of supply chains may require investments in relationship-
specific assets (RSA), information or human resources from all or a
subset of the partners. These investments are typically partially non-
verifiable, being based on internal resources or opportunity costs. We
extend previous work on the topic of coordination of complementary
relationship-specific “selfish” investments by considering a context of
repeated single-period bargaining under double asymmetric informa-
tion and outside options. Our model is a dyad in which a supplier
offers a single-price single-period contract for a good to a downstream
manufacturer (or retailer) who can accept or turn to some third party
before investing in the corresponding RSA. We show results when the
supplier uses repeated updating to estimate the manufacturer’s invest-
ment cost, determining a non-decreasing sequence of offers to incite
the coordination investment under asymmetric information on cost
and reservation utility for the manufacturer. The discussion of the
results suggests that the model may explain some differences observed
between collaborative theory and practice, namely asymmetry of in-
formation, over-investments and delayed agreement because of holdup
risk. The work is illustrated with numerical examples.
Keywords: Specific assets, contract design, asymmetric information,
rent capture, Bayesian belief
JEL Classification: C44, C73, D86
1 Introduction
A supply chain is a network of connected and interdependent organizations
mutually and co-operatively working together to control, manage and im-
prove the flow of materials and information from suppliers to end users
Aitken (1998). There is consensus both in academic and in applied circles
that supply chain optimization involves a relatively important emphasis on
intra-functional and inter-organizational collaboration, leading to coordina-
tion of processes, orders and information in areas such as customer service,
production planning, logistics, and capacity utilization. Supply chain coor-
dination has also been of very high importance for supply chain managers
in practice CSC (2009) for the last ten years. Still, Kampstra et al. (2006)
notice that progress towards deeper collaboration and coordination with
upstream suppliers and downstream customers is slow and frequently dis-
appointing in practice. The authors cite, among several reasons for failure,
the lack of trust, fear of external competition, missing infrastructure and
financial barriers for the sharing of resources and gains. Real supply chain
collaboration is documented as a rather slow process built on gradually in-
creased trust if the prerequisites for success, i.e. an adequately designed and
financed plan for how the coordination instruments should be developed, de-
ployed and monitored, are present. When it works, the partners invest time,
capital and human resources into adjusting their operations to their supply
chain partners’ corresponding processes, e.g. by changing and coordinat-
ing product and packaging dimensions, IT standards, EAN or RFID codes,
product catalogues, product development platforms, production planning
frequency, detail and systems. In particular the infrastructure standard in-
vestments that Kampstra et al. (2006) identify as lagging or missing are
relationship-specific, i.e. the adjustment to a given customer’s IT standards
has little or no value outside of that supply chain.
We identify three essential characteristics for these investments that in-
fluence the ability of the supply chain to design coordinating contracts.
First, the specificity of the coordination investment, that gives rational rea-
son to fear hold-up (i.e. post-contractual opportunistic action) from the
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supplier. Holdups are widely discussed in the academic literature since
Williamson (1975, 1985). Classical examples of holdups include the spe-
cialized dies used by Fisher Body to stamp out auto bodies for GM cars
Klein et al. (1978). A more recent example could arguably be the situation
in which Ryanair has found itself when Boeing decided to increase the cost
of long-term service contracts O’Doherty (2009). Since we are interested in
the investment incentives, what matters is not the frequency of the outcome
but the potential exposure to it.
Second, the investments of this type are intrinsically consisting of two
types of cost; verifiable and non-verifiable. The projects often mobilize
substantial share of non-verifiable cost, such as internal allocation of re-
sources, opportunity costs for time etc and projects that are coordinated
with other internal projects. An additional difficulty in the verifiability lies
in the non-uniqueness of the supply chain affiliation, i.e. the same partner
may be participating in different roles in several supply chains, potentially
in downstream competition. Thus, even in the cases when investments are
well-defined and verifiable, the potential cost sharing on multiple projects
make ”open-book” procedures ineffective in determining actual costs.
Third, the coordination investments are empirically (Cf. Kampstra et al.,
2006) subject to continuous and repeated financial negotiations within the
supply chain, often over several product generations.
In the particular case of logistics, Knemeyer et al. (2003) has surveyed
the outsourcing practice and shown that it involves investments in specific
assets and non-retrievable commitments of resources. Sucky (2007) point
to the trend towards outsourcing logistic activities as support to the argu-
ment that large firms are focusing their activities on their perceived core
competencies. In this paper, we address the question on how supply chains
may contractually coordinate their relationship-specific investments by a
stylized dynamic dyadic model of a supply chain that takes into account
the three main features above; i.e hold-up incentives from asset specificity,
asymmetric information on costs and opportunity costs from participation
in other supply chains and repeated bargaining on coordination investments
during a finite horizon. Whereas the literature has suggested a range of
remedies to the hold-up problem, such as in Hart and Moore (1990) and
references below, most work address the problem from one or two of these
perspectives. Our contribution is thus both positive and normative. From a
positive viewpoint, the findings for the investment delays and distortions in
our model correspond to anecdotal evidence stemming from the stated man-
agerial importance of the action, the available results from the mechanism
design literature and the high failure rate of the actual investments. From a
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decision-making stance, the Bayesian updating mechanism proposed for the
coordinator may be used under more general settings to inform sequential
bidding procedures.
To structure the presentation, we first present the centralized benchmark
under full information. This case of common information is not only the
reference point for efficiency estimations, but may also exist in vertically
integrated organizations where the supplier is e.g. a production division
and the manufacturer a distribution organization. We then investigate the
case where information about relation-specific investment cost is private to
the manufacturer, the supplier only has some prior belief on the costs. We
show how the supplier is able to extract extra rent from the manufacturer
even when she is not fully informed about the manufacturer’s other outside
opportunities or investment cost.
Our results indicate that the supplier will submit a sequence of bids
which leads to a positive expected delay in acceptance by the manufacturer.
It is also shown, contrary to the centralized benchmark, that the asymmetric
information induces over-investments by the manufacturer so as to create
options, lowering both the probability of profitable interaction and the over-
all supply chain rents. In the following section, we give some elements of
related literature on the subject. The third section describes the model in
which two distinct cases are investigated. We present in section 3.3 the full
information case and section 3.4 covers the case where the supplier is un-
aware of the investment costs that the manufacturer faces. To enable the
reader to grasp some of the significant points, a numerical instance helps to
position the different tradeoffs in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Literature review
The holdup problem under incomplete contracting and asymmetric infor-
mation has attracted considerable academic attention in economics, market-
ing and supply chain management. The properties of hold-up, asymmetry
of information, renegotiation, incompleteness of contracts, switching costs
and lock-ins have been investigated by authors such as Philippe Aghion,
Drew Fudenberg, Oliver Hart, Paul Klemperer, John Moore and Jean Tirole
among others through a range of interesting models. The stream in market-
ing literature on consumer switching costs and lock-in by competing firms is
particularly abundant. The models explored as presented in the literature
review in Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and references therein (Klemperer,
1987a,b, 1995, are the most relevant) are often restricted to full-information,
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two-period settings with endogenous downstream prices for various market
organizations. Within supply chain management, several models explore the
influence of a supplier’s offers on the buyer’s decision Sucky (2006, 2004),
and how the supplier can tailor his offers to obtain information private to
the buyer Li et al. (2009). In the case where the downstream partner Cho
and Gerchak (2005) or partners Plambeck and Taylor (2007) is (are) en-
dowed with operating costs and the possibility to invest, provide several
coordination mechanisms for the decentralized chain.
The starting point for the present model is the standard contracting
model with complete but unverifiable information and “ex ante renegotia-
tion” Maskin (1999); Maskin and Moore (1999); Watson (2006). Our model
is an application of Game Theory in supply chain management, as charac-
terized in Cachon and Netessine (2004) and Leng and Parlar (2005) and ref-
erences therein. Some additional structure is added to the stylized problem
by (i) considering a finite multi-period horizon, (ii) considering private infor-
mation on both the coordination investment and the manufacturer’s reser-
vation utility, (iii) by excluding contractual commitment. These assump-
tions match firms involved in B-to-B transactions, long-term relationships,
asymmetric information of the buyer’s willingness to pay and sophisticated
multi-period contract renegotiation. In the present model, additionally to
the contract payments made, we investigate the cases where the seller offers
a side-payment to the buyer. This type of side-payment is not of the sup-
ply chain coordinating type as investigated and discussed in Leng and Zhu
(2009) but rather of the rent expropriation one. Cvsa and Gilbert (2002)
look into the purchasing incentives offered by a monopolistic supplier to
competing buyers to induce strategic commitment and hence early order-
quantity decisions in the face of demand uncertainty. With this incentive,
the whole supply chain gains without compromising any of the supply chain
members’ profits.
The current model draws on a static model under commitment as in
Brusset (2009). The present setting resembles the sequential bargaining
or renegotiation of rental price with one buyer under asymmetric informa-
tion about his willingness-to-pay seen in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) which
characterizes the set of equilibria of two-period bargaining games when the
seller and buyer each have two potential types (two-sided incomplete infor-
mation), when the seller makes the offers and when the players alternate
making offers. The single-buyer interpretation when the buyer is willing to
trade and profitable mutual interaction is given has been looked into by Fu-
denberg et al. (1985) which demonstrate that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
exists when the buyer’s type follows a smooth bounded density.
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Segal and Whinston (2002) provide an excellent survey over mechanism
design with renegotiation in settings like the current one, i.e. with hold-
up risk and asymmetric information on “selfish investments”. Tirole (1986)
and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) deal with investment in cost reduction
by the seller which results in an advantage over the uninformed buyer. In
the present model, it is the buyer who realizes a selfish investment and the
seller who is not informed of the investment cost (“selfish investments” as in
Hart and Moore, 1999). In Tirole (1986), the seller obtains an information
rent whereas in our model the buyer does not disclose the investment cost
to the seller so as to mitigate the hold-up risk in future periods.
In the games theoretic literature, Watson and Wignall (2009) builds
upon the standard contracting model using unverifiable rather than incom-
plete information, verifiable and unverifiable actions and with and without
renegotiation. In Miyagawa et al. (2008), the folk theorem in repeated games
where a player can buy information is presented. Segal and Whinston (2000)
investigates the use of renegotiable exclusivity contracts with the seller in-
vesting in RSA and the buyer being able to buy from a third party. In
Gonza´lez (2004), the agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-
reducing specific investment unobservable by the principal. To escape the
hold-up, the agent randomizes the investment whereas the principal offers
screening contracts. In Battaglini (2007), the model characterizes the op-
timal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in
which the agent can change types stochastically over time by means of con-
tract menus offered by the principal.
We consider that the supplier is a Bayesian rational player who is able to
sequentially update her belief of the manufacturer’s cost and outside option
using responses to past offers. This mechanism is generally called Bayesian
updating with cutoff. The updating of beliefs using cutoffs has been studied
in Hart and Tirole (1988) but that mechanism cannot be applied ex abrupto
here because of the difference in the buyer’s and seller’s motivations and
utilities. In Cachon and Lariviere (1999), another Bayesian game based on
exchange only of offers and responses (no signaling) is the capacity alloca-
tion problem facing a single supplier with multiple retailers enjoying private
demand information.
In this model the new prior, based upon the updating of the posterior,
is defined using a simplicity criterion, or “Simplicity Postulate” as defined
by Harold Jeffreys in the sense that the prior must be built with as few
parameters as possible. To do so in this paper, the posterior distribution on
the parameter has the same distributional form as the prior and updating
these parameters can be done easily Porteus (2002).
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3 Model
Two players, a manufacturer (he) and a supplier (she) may engage in mu-
tually beneficial trade over a finite horizon of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} periods. The
manufacturer can trade with the supplier or with an outside option. If he
trades with the supplier, he invests A (strictly positive, irreversible). He
invests a (strictly positive, irreversible) if choosing to trade with the outside
option. The effect of the respective investments is lasting, such that trade
is enabled in any successive period following the corresponding investment.
Note that this setting means that the successive periods are interrelated and
not exchangeable as in many multi-period with renegotiation game theoretic
settings Watson (2006). The models assume that the value of trade is al-
ways higher than the cost. The manufacturer minimizes his expected cost
C of trading either with the supplier or the outside option. The supplier
can trade costlessly with the manufacturer but is required to sink a specific
investment as to initiate trade with a third party. The supplier’s objective
is to maximize her partial profit function Πs1.
In time (see figure 1), the supplier, as Stackelberg leader, offers a con-
tract. If the manufacturer accepts, he invests in the required specific assets
A, unless not done in any prior period. Services are performed and pay-
out takes place2. If the manufacturer rejects the offer, both turn to outside
options: incurring the corresponding enabling investments a and as, respec-
tively, unless already sunk (this option is not represented in figure 1).
At each period i, the supplier is offering single-period take-it-or-leave-
it wholesale price contracts U i with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The strictly positive
contract (i.e. service fee) which the manufacturer may sign with some third
party is labeled u and shall be considered to be time invariant. The supplier
can also sign a strictly positive time-invariant contract us with a third party.
We call δim the manufacturer’s participation decision variable in period i ∈
{0, 1}. Table 1 recapitulates the notation relative to this paper.
The investments made by the manufacturer are unobservable by the
supplier. We shall study two information scenarios. In §3.3, the supplier
is informed of the cost to the manufacturer of the investment he realizes.
In §3.4, the supplier does not possess this information and so relies on his
beliefs.
1The third parties for the supplier and the manufacturer are not strategic players and
can be seen as recourse to an uncoordinated market.
2Since there is no new information revealed, compliance conditions are irrelevant here.
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Table 1: Table of notations
Type Notation Definition
A Specific asset investment with the supplier
a Specific asset investment with outside option
u contract available to manufacturer from third party
U i contract offered in period i by supplier to manufacturer
Manufacturer C
i(.) manufacturer’s cost function in period i
δim
binary decision variable,
1 when agreeing with supplier
vim manufacturer trading strategy vectors in state i
Rim manufacturer traading strategy set in state i
as specific investment by supplier in outside option
Supplier us
outside option contract available
in period i to supplier
Πis(.) supplier’s profit function in period i
fZ(A), pdf of belief about Z = u+ a−A
FZ(Z) cdf of belief about Z = u+ a−A
fA(A) pdf of belief of A
FA(A) cdf of belief of A
fa(a) pdf and cdf of supplier’s belief of a
Fa(a) cdf of supplier’s belief of a
Supplier p1 parameter set in period 1 of belief distribution
beliefs ω increment to p1
fAi(Ai) pdf of supplier’s revised belief of A in period i
FAi(Ai) cdf of supplier’s revised belief of A in period i
Li FAi(Ai)
￿
(n− i+ 1)u−Ai￿+
FAi(Ai)
￿
us + L
i+1
￿
vis supplier strategy vectors in state i
Ris supplier strategy set in state i
7
????????????
????????
???????
??????
????????
????????
?????????
??????
?????????
??
????????
???????
???????
??
????????
???????
???????
?????????
?????????
??????
????????
?????????????
Figure 1: Timeline of events when manufacturer and supplier agree on a
contract and to a new relationship. If the manufacturer in one turn of
the game does not agree to a contract, trade with third parties occur (not
represented).
3.1 Updating process for the supplier
We assume that the supplier is a Bayesian rationalist who builds her as-
sumptions from her experience at the start of the first period. Using these
priors, she calculates her most profitable estimate of the variables involved
and makes the corresponding offer to the manufacturer. Unless the manufac-
turer agrees to the first contract offered, in the following period the supplier
must update her belief about these unknowns in a dynamic updating pro-
cess Selten (1975). This belief is based upon a distribution of the unknowns
which can be described by continuous distribution functions with increas-
ing failure rates (IFR) as defined in Barlow and Proschan (1965). These
distributions are characterized by a single parameter which is a function of
the period and a prior estimate of this parameter in period 1. Given the
complexity of determining a dynamically optimal updating policy under a
given set of priors, we opt for a pragmatic approach that provides a fixed
increment in the updating. The increment is a parameter in the model,
although theoretically it could be a function of past responses, remaining
horizon and updated priors. We have
pn = p1 + nω, (1)
where ω is the increment between periods. If we consider that p1 is the
mean of the distribution, ω is the scaling coefficient. Each period’s prior
8
should be updated using the posterior from the preceding period. Since the
manufacturer refused the earlier period’s offer, then the prior was too low
and the parameter should be increased by this posterior to define the new
parameter. However, given that we shall proceed in a backward recursion
to solve the evaluation of the unknowns in previous periods, applying H.
Jeffreys’ Simplicity Postulate and following the method provided in Porteus
(2002), we set ω as fixed in all periods and will start with the last period.
The distribution can thus be scaled by a parameter using a function of
the belief about the unknown to enhance the likeliness of the manufacturer’s
acceptance but without compromising the supplier’s profit. We have
F i(.|pi) = F i−1(.|pi−1) (2)
with F i as the distribution function of the belief about the unknown in
period i. In the following we shall indicate each unknown’s distribution
function only by its period superscript.
3.2 Coordinated benchmark
Consider the integration of the two firms under a common ownership. The
per-period benefit of service is positive. The problem is a cost minimization
one. Denote the joint cost function V (.) The integrated firm has two op-
tions: (i) performing the services internally by the supplier, or (ii) relying
on external service provision from period 1. Naturally, the option of chang-
ing regime has no value to the integrated firm as the outside options have
constant prices. V ∗ = AV ￿ = a+as+n∗(u−us). By inspection, the shifting
policy dominates iff a + as + n(u − us) < A. We limit our interest to the
“mutual beneficial trade” case, defined by the following two conditions:
nu+ a−A ≥ nus − as. Condition 1 (3)
u ≥ us, Condition 2
If the second condition is violated, there is no marginal room for beneficial
trade. The first condition provides a basis for evaluation of any switching
policy, say in period τ . The coordination loss equals then:
V (τ)− V ∗ = A+ a+ as + τ(u− us)−A = a+ as + τ(u− us). (4)
Using condition 2 in (4), we can then state that the marginal cost of de-
lay is positive and that there are two sources of coordination losses: over-
investment in relationship assets a+ as and inferior trade conditions u−us.
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Table 2: The manufacturer’s investment in RSA according to his decisions
in first (horizontal) and second (vertical) period.
δ1m
δ2m
1 A+ a A
0 a A+ a
0 1
Table 3: The supplier’s investment in RSA according to the manufacturer’s
decisions in first (horizontal) and second (vertical) period.
δ1m
δ2m
1 as 0
0 as as
0 1
These and other aspects will be studied in depth in the asymmetric
information scenario in §3.4.
3.3 Full information and renegotiation
In the full information case, the supplier presents offers using full information
about the manufacturer’s investment costs A and a as well as his outside
options u. The corresponding relationship specific investments which he
incurs are presented in table 3 for a two-period example.
We enumerate the manufacturer’s options in the n period game starting
with the decisions to be taken at the leaves of the decision tree.
The game is logically decomposed in three states depending on the en-
abling investment(s) by the manufacturer: (S) exclusive investment for the
supplier, (ST) investments for both the supplier and the third party, (T)
investment only in third party trade. Calculations of the manufacturer’s
optimal contract for each state are in Appendix §6.1.
Using the mutual beneficial trade conditions (3) in State S , we present
in figure 2 a graph of the acceptation area. The area in which the supplier
will offer mutually interesting terms to the manufacturer is when the cost
for the RSA that the manufacturer has to invest in to work with the supplier
is lower than what both would have to invest separately if they turned to
their respective outside options.
We present the result of the common information game as a Proposition.
Proposition 1 Full information
10
us
u
A ￿ ￿a ￿ as￿
n
Accept
Reject
Figure 2: The acceptance or rejection areas in which supplier and manufac-
turer over n periods in terms of u, us.
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Given mutual interaction potential for manufacturer and supplier (3), the
following optimal contract is a (weak) Nash Equilibrium (NE)
U1 = u−A,
U i = u, ∀i, 2 ≤ i < n,
Un = u+ a.
(5)
Because this equilibrium is weak, the supplier is exposed to considerable
risk for costly mis-coordination by the manufacturer. This can be reworded
in the following remark.
Remark 1 The NE in Proposiion 1 is not trembling hand perfect.
The proofs are provided in §6.2 of the Appendix 6.
The remark has practical implications: when the manufacturer changes
to his outside option, the cost is the same to him but not the profit to the
supplier. We note (although not developed here in a supplier-driven bargain-
ing) that this condition naturally would be exploited by the manufacturer
in an open bargaining process.
We now turn our attention to the case of asymmetric information.
3.4 Asymmetric information and renegotiation
We assume that the relationship-specific costs A and a are now the manu-
facturer’s private information. To make offers, the supplier relies on a priori
information on the distribution for A as supported by [A,A], following a
cumulative density distribution FA, and for a as supported by [a, a] and
following a cumulative density distribution Fa. We assume that these distri-
butions have increasing failure rates (IFR). The supplier updates her belief
about A and a, respectively, as new information on rejection potentially
arrives in the dynamic game. Note that the supplier still observes the cost
u to the manufacturer (it could be the market price for similar product or
service).
The Nash Equilibirum in the full-information case in (3.3) no longer
holds. If A1∗ < A or if a∗ > a, the manufacturer will reject the supplier’s
offer.
We spell out a new proposition applicable to the present scenario using
the results from the calculations relegated to the Appendix in §6.3.
Proposition 2 Asymmetric information
Given asymmetric information about investment specific costs A and a and
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mutual interaction potential, the contracts offered are
U1 = u−A1∗,
U i = u, 1 < i < n,
Un = u+ a∗.
(6)
If A1∗ < A, the supplier offers in subsequent periods i contracts such thatU
i = u−Ai∗, i ≤ max(n− j)
j
,
U t = u, i < t ≤ n, iff δim = 1,
(7)
with 
Ai∗ +
FAi(Ai∗)
fAi(A(i∗)
= (n− i+ 1)u− us − Li+1,
Li =FAi(A
i)
￿
(n− i+ 1)u−Ai￿+
FAi(Ai)
￿
us + L
i+1
￿
n− j ≥ A
j∗
u− us , (PC)
Ai∗ > A(i−1)∗. (IC)
(8)
We can also look at the rent which accrues to the supply chain composed
of the supplier and the manufacturer over the n periods and formulate the
following third proposition, the proof of which has been relegated to §6.4 in
the appendix..
Proposition 3 Given asymmetric information about investment specific costs
A and a and mutual interaction potential over the n periods, there is a risk
that interaction between the supplier and manufacturer will not start in the
first period, reducing the supply chain rent. There is also a risk of over-
investment equal to a + as by both supplier and manufacturer in the event
that the manufacturer decides to fall back on his outside option in any period.
We now illustrate these propositions.
4 Numerical illustration
A manufacturer and a supplier interact over n = 20 periods. Let
A = 50, u = 100, a = 60, us = 80,
as = 55, p1 = 30, ω = 1. (9)
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4.1 Scenario of full information
In the case of common information the offers are straightforward and, ac-
cording to Proposition 1, yield the following multi-period contract
U1 = 100− 50,
U i = 100, ∀i, 2 ≤ i < 20,
U20 = 100 + 60.
(10)
The manufacturer pays over 20 periods 2060 (including A = 50), exactly the
same cost than his outside option (2060). The supplier earns a larger profit
than with her outside option (1545). The chain has no coordination loss.
4.2 Scenario of asymmetric information
When information about investment in RSA is asymmetric, the supplier
must establish the thresholds for A and a which will maximize her profits.
We implement here the updating procedure described in §3.4 for the
belief about A. In the first period, the supplier must set up her prior belief
about A, define the seed pn and the step ω by which this parameter will
decrease between period 20 and period 1. We set ω = 1. For example, when
we start with a normal distribution with p20 = 50 in period 20, the threshold
A20∗ = 17.2. In period 1, from (1), we write the mean of the distribution as
p1 = p20−20×1 = 30 and A1∗ = 49. In this illustration, we shall present the
results for several values of the seed pn but a fixed increment ω. Let A follow
a normal distribution function such that NA(pn, 10) truncated at 0. Initially,
the supplier sets the belief about a to follow a normal distribution function
Na(60, 10) truncated at 0. We apply the results assembled in Proposition
2. We begin with a∗ so as to later find As1∗ . Solving using (45), we obtain
a∗ = 42.22.
4.3 Updating mechanism
In our first approach, we evaluate Aj∗ using (8) and updating the distribu-
tion functions with ω = 1 and p20 = 50 so that p1 = 30. This yields the
results listed in column 3 of table 4.
The first two period estimates do not allow the supplier to win over the
manufacturer’s agreement: she has to wait till the third period to obtain an
agreement by the manufacturer. However, in the meantime, both have had
to invest in their outside option’s specific relationship assets a and as. This
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illustrates Proposition 3 presented above. Hence, the supplier is no longer
able to extract the amount a from the manufacturer in the last period.
In the third column of this table, the supplier’s profit is to be compared
to what she would have obtained from using her outside option from the
start (first column). In the same way, the manufacturer’s cost in this setup
is to be compared to the cost incurred if he had turned to his outside option
from the outset. The supplier is much better off, whereas the manufacturer
bears essentially the same cost.
4.4 The supplier starts with different beliefs
Table 4 presents the result for p20 ranging between 50 and 160 in steps of
10, enlarging the previous numerical example to different seeds p20 which
represent different a priori beliefs in period 1. In the last three lines are
recorded the contract in the first period, the profit to the supplier given the
acceptance by the manufacturer of the relevant contracts and the cost to
the manufacturer.
If we take the cases where p20 ≥ 60 (fifth to last columns), the thresholds
in period 1 A1∗ are higher than A and hence the contracts offered would have
been accepted in the first period. The supplier entices the manufacturer into
accepting her first offer. Thereafter, the supplier can extract the last period
investment cost a without the manufacturer refusing to work with her.
In figure 3, we can observe how the supply chain rent constituted by the
difference between the supplier’s profit and the manufacturer’s cost evolves
according to the seed. The impact of Proposition 3 can clearly be seen when
p20 ≤ 50. As this seed increases the overall rent increases quickly before
reaching a plateau due to the increasing profit generated by the supplier.
Note that the first contract offered when p20 ≥ 110 is a payment by the
supplier to the manufacturer! Even in these cases, the profit over the 20
periods is higher than the one obtained by turning to her outside option or
by missing the manufacturer’s first period agreement (see figure 3).
The attentive reader will note that the manufacturer stands to reduce
his cost the higher he signals A to be. Moreover, this signaling coordinates
better the supply chain. The supplier’s profit is maximal when she slightly
underestimates the manufacturer’s investment cost A in the first period
(when p20 = 60, p1 = 40). She should not consider the manufacturer’s
signal as trustworthy. Both attitudes can be observed in practice.
The risk, cost of over-investment and potential for supply chain ineffi-
ciency are clearly apparent when the supplier underestimates the manufac-
turer’s investment cost (first four columns).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the supplier’s profit (bottom thin line) and manu-
facturer’s cost according to the supplier’s initial belief. When p20 ≥ 60,
the manufacturer accepts the supplier’s first offer and is held up in the last
period.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model of a manufacturer and a supplier
when the manufacturer has yet to invest in the RSA required to work with
the supplier and has private information about the cost of such investment.
We characterize the NE when the supplier’s Bayesian belief about the man-
ufacturer’s investment costs follow distributions which exhibit Increasing
Failure Rates. Under full information, the ensuing NE are weak and not
trembling hand perfect. Under asymmetric information, the NE is trem-
bling hand perfect and the manufacturer’s best course is to agree with the
supplier’s offers whenever it is less onerous.
We show that, when engaging with the manufacturer in a multi-period
relationship, the supplier has initially to sweeten her offer and can later
hold the manufacturer up by the cost of RSA with a third party. This
holdup is only partly reduced when the manufacturer withholds the RSA
cost information. We show that this rent extraction can only take place in
the last period, an attempt at holding up the manufacturer any earlier can
only be met by evasion. To protect himself, the manufacturer invests in two
different RSA, thus impairing supply chain efficiency.
The supplier’s strategy induces a temporal link among the negotiating
periods: she is motivated to renew the relationship so as to be in a position
to hold the manufacturer up in the last period. This effect contributes to
explain the inertia of the partners when considering switching decisions.
This effect is similar to the marketing literature lock-in effect considered in
Klemperer (1995).
Finally, we show that there exist risk of supply chain rent reduction. This
rent reduction is independent of the supplier’s estimate of the manufacturer’s
costs.
We show in the numerical illustration how the manufacturer’s cost is
reduced when the supplier over-estimates his RSA cost. This effect can be
related to common anecdotic observation of customers over-declaring the
effort deployed to establish the relationship to their suppliers.
6 Appendix
6.1 Evaluation of contracts offered in each of manufacturer’s
states
We present here the evaluations for the offers made by the supplier according
to the state the manufacturer finds himself in in the full information scenario
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of §3.3.
In state S, the manufacturer has only undertaken investment A; in state
ST, he has incurred both investment A and investment a, whereas in state
T, he has only invested a.
State S:
Manufacturer has made a single investment, A in period one.
In the last period n, her cost becomes
Cn = min(Un, u+ a). (11)
Under strict rationality, the supplier’s dominant offer must thus be:
Un = u+ a, (12)
In period n− 1, the manufacturer faces the cost function
Cn−1 = min(Un−1 + u+ a, 2u+ a), (13)
bounding Un−1 ≤ u for mutual trade.
It follows that in any period j, j > 1, the manufacturer has to solve
Cj = min(U j + (n− j)u+ a, (n− j + 1)u+ a). (14)
So, to ensure incentive compatibility, the supplier is limited to offering
U j ≤ u, ∀j, 2 ≤ j < n. (15)
In state S, the overall minimized cost function becomes
C = nu+ a. (16)
The supplier’s maximal profit is
Πs = nu+ a−A. (17)
The supplier’s optimal strategy under the conditions (3) consist of the
profit maximizing contracts as an n-sized vector:
vSm = ((u−A), u, . . . , u+ a). (18)
Let us call the manufacturer’s strategy when he is in state S the n-sized
vector comprised of the decisions δim in response to the offers as
vSr = (δ
1
m, δ
2
m, . . . , δ
n
m), ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, δim = 1. (19)
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The strategy sets RSm and R
S
r for each player are reduced to just one vector
in each.
State ST:
The manufacturer has invested A and a, the supplier has invested as. In the
last period n, the manufacturer’s cost function is
Cn = min(Un, u)⇒ Un ≤ u (20)
for acceptance. By extension, U j ≤ u, in periods j, 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
The threat strategy for the manufacturer is to accept the introductory
offer u−A in period 1 and then reject the renewal of the contract in period
2, resulting in
C2 = u+ a, (21)
whether or not the supplier offers u. The total cost for this strategy over n
periods is
C = nu+ a, (22)
with the supplier’s corresponding profit as
Πs = (n− 1)u+ us −A− as (23)
Imagine that in period k, 1 < k ≤ n, the manufacturer invests A, the profit
function becomes
Π￿s = (k − 1)u−A− as + us + (n− k)max(u, us), (24)
and Π￿s ≤ Πs.
The strategies of manufacturer and supplier are now described by the
following sets of vectors
RSTm = {vSTm , vSTm =
￿
(u−A), u, . . . , u￿}
RSTr = {vSTr , vSTr = (δ1m, δ2m, . . . , δnm), (25)
∃i, 1 < i < n, δim = 0}. (26)
STATE T:
The manufacturer has only invested a, supplier has invested as. In period
j, the minimum acceptable offer from the supplier would be
U j = u−A, if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, δim = 0, (27)
which the supplier can repeat as long as j ≤ n − Au−us . At a latest period
jmax above that limit, the supplier makes no offer that could be accepted
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by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer agrees in period k, k ≤ n− j the
stream of profits to the supplier over n periods is:
Πs = (k − 1)us − as + (n− k + 1)u−A, (28)
In any case, the cost to the manufacturer remains
C = nu+ a. (29)
In this state, the sets of vectors representing the strategies available to the
players are
RTm = {vTm, vTm =
￿
(u−A), u, . . . , u￿}
RTr = {vTr , vTr = (0, δ2m, . . . , δnm),
∃i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, δim = 1}. (30)
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. When comparing the strategies among the three states, we see
that in the first state, the supplier exploits the incumbent’s advantage of the
relationship specific investment with the manufacturer’s outside option only
in the very last game. If she were to try doing so before, the manufacturer
would simply defect. If the supplier’s participation constraint
nu+ a−A ≥ nus − as, (31)
is satisfied, the profit extracted in state 1 is larger than the ones in either
other states. This justifies that she offers in all periods
U i = u, ∀i, 1 < i < n. (32)
Given that the supplier is Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer is
reduced to accepting or rejecting the offers and that both work in a full
information environment, the NE strategy is the one presented in the case
of state 1: the manufacturer agrees to the contract offered in the first period
and, under sequential rationality Watson (2002), subsequently accepts all
the offers made by the supplier without deviating by working with his outside
option.
We will now investigate the weakness of this NE. The cartesian set
Rs × Rm represents all the available strategies of both players. This set
is larger than the union of the three sets defined when describing the three
states in which the manufacturer finds herself. However, all the strategies
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which do not belong to the sets Rm1, Rm2, and Rm3 are evidently not profit
maximizing ones or do not satisfy the participation constraints as binding
constraints and shall be discarded.
For the supplier, it can easily be seen that, with vs1 as defined in (19),
∀vm ∈ Rm and vm ￿= vs1, Πs(vs1) > Πs(vm). (33)
For the manufacturer, evidently
Rm = Rm1 ∪Rm2 ∪Rm3, (34)
so
∀vm ∈ Rm, C(vm) = nu+ a, ⇒
￿ v∗m ∈ Rm |C(v∗m) > C(vm). (35)
Hence, the NE is weak.
If the manufacturer chooses other responses, his strategies can be assim-
ilated to the “Trembling Hand” Selten (1975). The three states presented
above are in fact occurrences of this Trembling Hand argument: as can be
seen in table 5, the manufacturer may costlessly play a different strategy
which hurts the supplier. Due to the Stackelberg structure, we do not ex-
plore the other rent-appropriation possibilities and conclude that the NE is
not a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
6.3 Evaluations of offers according to the manufacturer’s
state
We present here the calculations which enable the supplier to evaluate opti-
mal offers for each of the manufacturer’s states in the scenario of asymmetric
information in §3.4. The supplier now must formulate offers as functions of
thresholds A1∗, a∗ and eventually the updated thresholds Ai∗ in periods i
so that she maximizes her profit. We first evaluate the strategies open to
both players before presenting the calculations of those thresholds.
6.3.1 Strategies and manufacturer’s states...
STATE S
This state is attained only if the supplier’s threshold A1∗ ≥ A to incite
an acceptance by the manufacturer. So, given the sequential rationality of
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the manufacturer, he works with the supplier for this and all periods up
to period n − 1 with probability 1 as long as the reservation utility is met.
In the last period, the manufacturer accepts the final hold-up only if the
supplier’s threshold a∗ ≤ a.
The supplier’s strategy is structurally analogous to the full information
case in §3.3: 
U1 = u−A1∗,
U i = u, 1 < i < n,
Un = u+ a∗,
(36)
under the adjusted participation constraint for the supplier:
nu−A1∗ + a∗ ≥ nus − as. (PC) (37)
The manufacturer’s cost and supplier’s profit over the n periods are
C = nu−A1∗ +A+ a∗,
Πs = nu−A1∗ + a∗. (38)
When period n starts, the supplier must now show her offer using a∗. If
a∗ > a, the manufacturer rejects the offer, δnm = 0. The manufacturer’s cost
and supplier’s profit when terminating in state S are
C = nu−A1∗ +A+ a,
Πs = (n− 1)u−A1∗ + us − as. (39)
STATE ST
The double-investment state is attained at the earliest in period 2 if the
supplier’s threshold A1∗ ≤ A made the manufacturer reject the initial offer
and accept it in a subsequent period k, 1 < k ≤ n. The supplier has incurred
as and the manufacturer has incurred investments A+ a up to this period.
The dominant strategy for state ST is trivial, there is no opportunity
for hold-up in the last period since the manufacturer has a sunk investment
with the third party. Thus, the resulting strategy for the supplier for all
subsequent periods j = k + 1, ..., n is
U j = u, (40)
which follows from Condition 2.
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The manufacturer cost and supplier profit expressions are, respectively:
C = nu−Ak∗ +A+ a
Πs = (n− k)u−Ak∗ + kus − as. (41)
STATE T
In State T, the manufacturer has only invested in a third-party relation
a, resulting from Ak∗ < A in all preceding periods k. The supplier may
propose a new contract Aj that, if accepted by the manufacturer, would
change the state to ST. An updated offer in period j, is made if If u > us,
in the second period and in all posterior ones up to period n − j such
that the supplier’s participation constraint and the manufacturer’s incentive
compatibility constraint
j + 1 ≥ A
(n−j)∗
u− us , (PC)
A(n−j)∗ < A(n−j+1)∗ (IC) (42)
are satisfied, the supplier updates3 her threshold A∗ .
If the game terminates in state T, the manufacturer and supplier have
never worked together: the manufacturer’s overall cost and supplier’s overall
profit can be written
C = nu+ a
Πs = nus − as. (43)
Figure 4 represents the three possible states and the manufacturer’s de-
cisions leading to them.
6.3.2 Bid determination
We now present the evaluations of the thresholds that enable the supplier
to calibrate her offers to the manufacturer. Her objective is to maximize her
profit given these thresholds and possible strategies. The objective function
3This evaluation is presented later.
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Figure 4: States of nature according to the supplier’s thresholds Aj∗ and a∗.
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for the supplier can be summarized as
maxΠs(A
j) =
FA1(A
1)
￿
(n− 1)u−A1 + Fa(a)
￿
u+ a
￿
+
Fa(a)(us − as)
￿
+
FA1(A
1)
￿
us − as + FA2(A2)
￿
(n− 1)u−A2￿+
FA2(A
2)
￿
us + FA3(A
3)
￿
(n− 2)u−A3
￿
+ . . .
FA(n−j)(An−j)
￿
(j + 1)u−An−j￿+
us + FA(n−j)(An−j)((j + 1)us) . . .
￿￿
,
(44)
s.t.

(j + 1)(u− us) ≥ A(n−j), (PC)
A(n−j) ≥ A(n−j+1), (IC)
nu+ a−A1 ≥ nus − as, (PC).
6.3.3 Belief about the manufacturer’s RSA a
We first turn to the belief about the manufacturer’s investment into specific
assets relative to his outside option a which the supplier has to make in
period n (if at all).
Assuming that fa has an IFR and fa(a) ￿= 0, there exists an interior
value a∗ such that
a∗ − Fa(a
∗)
fa(a∗)
= us − as − u. (45)
Proof. The first differential of the profit function (44) is written:
∂Πs(a)
∂a
= FA(A)
￿
fa(a)
￿
us − as − u− a
￿
+ Fa(a)
￿
. (46)
This leads to the F.O.C.
(u+ a)− (us − as) = Fa(a)
fa(a)
. (47)
The S.O.C. requires that the following inequality be true
f ￿a(a
∗)
￿
us − as − u− a
￿− 2fa(a∗) < 0, (48)
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which, when replacing us − as − u − a by its value in (47), means that we
must have
−f ￿a(a)
Fa(a)
fa(a)
− 2fa(a) < 0. (49)
Since fa(a) is positive for all a in the range [a, a], we can restate this in-
equality as
f ￿a(a)(Fa(a)− 1)− 2f2a (a) < 0. (50)
However, we have assumed that the distribution of a is IFR which means
that the failure rate r(a) = fa(a)/Fa(a) is weakly increasing for those values
of a for which Fa(a) < 1 Barlow and Proschan (1965). Then the first
differential of the function r, which is written
∂r(a)
∂a
=
f ￿a(a)(1− Fa(a)) + fa(a)2
(1− Fa(a))2 (51)
must be positive or null, so that
∂r(a)
∂a
≥ 0⇒ f ￿a(a)(Fa(a)− 1)− fa(a)2 ≤ 0. (52)
This last condition is stronger than the one spelt in (50) because fa(a)2 > 0.
6.3.4 Updated belief about the manufacturer’s RSA with the
supplier An−j
In period n− j, the last period in which (42) are satisfied, the manufacturer
is in state T. The supplier makes a last update of A. The first differential
of her profit function in terms of An−j is written
∂Π(n−j)s (An−j)
∂An−j
=fA(n−j)(An−j)
￿
(j+1)(u−us)−An−j
￿
− FA(n−j)(An−j)
￿
. (53)
The S.O.C. requires that
f ￿A(n−j)(A
(n−j)∗)
￿
(j + 1)(u− us)−A(n−j)∗
￿−
2fA(n−j)(A(n−j)∗) < 0. (54)
The proof is similar to the one presented in §?? of the Appendix 6.
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So, from (53), and since (54) is true, we can deduct the optimal threshold
A(n−j)∗ in period n− j as solution to
A(n−j)∗ +
FA(n−j)(A(n−j)∗)
fA(n−j)(A(n−j)∗)
= (j + 1)(u− us), (55)
Using backward induction, we can now evaluate the threshold for A in
the previous period starting with period n − j − 1. The profit function in
preceding periods i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− j − 1, can be written as
Li = FAi(A
i)
￿
(n− i+ 1)u−Ai￿+ FAi(Ai)￿us + Li+1￿. (56)
In period n− j, the last term of the series L is written as
Ln−j =FAn−j(An−j)
￿
(j+1)u−An−j￿+
FAn−j(An−j)
￿
(j+1)us
￿
. (57)
The optimal threshold in each period i is the result of evaluating the
F.O.C. and S.O.C. of the expression Li differentiated in Ai for 2 ≤ i < n−j.
Following along the lines of the proof provided in §?? in Appendix 6, we
obtain
Ai∗ +
FAi(Ai∗)
fAi(Ai∗)
= (n− i+ 1)u− us − Li+1. (58)
and proceeding in a bootstrapping iteration we evaluate all the preceding
Li back to L2 and A1:
A1∗ +
FA1(A1∗)
fA1(A1∗)
= (n− 2)u− us − L2 (59)
To be incorporated in contracts that can be offered to the manufacturer,
the thresholds evaluated above must follow the strategy which we described
when the manufacturer is in state ST or T, namely that Ai∗ < A(i+1)∗ for
the first few periods.
By definition, Li represents the expected profit to the supplier going
forward in periods i + 1 to n when she has not yet gotten an acceptance
from the manufacturer. As i increases, this expected profit decreases since
each period’s profit is positive, even if it consists in taking her outside option.
So
Li+1 < Li. (60)
Further, from (58), even if the distribution of the belief about A is not
updated, in each period, the period’s threshold is higher than the previous
one’s.
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Moreover, since the supplier offers a sequence of initially increasing bids,
A∗1 < A∗2 < . . . < Ai∗. (61)
We reach a point where Ai becomes large compared to (n − i + 1)u within
Li in (56). By construction, after that point Ai can no longer increase and
in fact decreases as can be seen in the numerical illustration presented in
§4. So the supplier cannot make an offer more enticing than the previous
one to the manufacturer. Instead, the supplier turns to her outside option.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We have seen in the integrated supply chain that if the mutual
interaction is delayed by τ periods, then the loss in rent to the supply chain
is given by the difference between the cost to the manufacturer and the
profit to the supplier:￿
C = a+ nu+A−Aτ+1∗
Πs = τus − as −Aτ+1∗ + (n− τ)u,
⇒ C −Πs = τ(us−u)− as− a−A.
(62)
Whereas, if the interaction starts in period 1, the partners objective function
work out as ￿
C = A−A∗ + nu− a∗
Πs = nu−A∗ + a∗,
⇒ C −Πs = −A. (63)
This leads to the difference between both cases of
∆ = τ(us − u)− as − a, (64)
which is strictly negative because us ≤ u according to the PC in (3).
Note that this result is independent of the period in which the manu-
facturer decides to change supplier. It is also independent of the supplier’s
estimates of a and A.
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d
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20
30
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70
80
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
1
22
.1
29
.8
39
.1
49
.
5
9
.
6
9
.
7
9
.
8
9
.
9
9
.
1
0
9
.
1
1
9
.
1
2
9
.
2
22
.8
30
.6
40
.1
5
0
.
60
.
70
.
80
.
90
.
10
0.
11
0.
12
0.
13
0.
3
23
.5
31
.5
41
.
51
.
61
.
71
.
81
.
91
.
10
1.
11
1.
12
1.
13
1.
4
24
.2
32
.4
42
.
52
.
62
.
72
.
82
.
92
.
10
2.
11
2.
12
2.
13
2.
5
24
.9
33
.4
43
.
53
.
63
.
73
.
83
.
93
.
10
3.
11
3.
12
3.
13
3.
6
25
.7
34
.3
44
.
54
.
64
.
74
.
84
.
94
.
10
4.
11
4.
12
4.
13
4.
7
26
.4
35
.2
45
.
55
.
65
.
75
.
85
.
95
.
10
5.
11
5.
12
5.
13
5.
8
27
.2
36
.2
46
.
56
.
66
.
76
.
86
.
96
.
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6.
11
6.
12
6.
13
6.
9
28
.1
37
.1
47
.
57
.
67
.
77
.
87
.
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.
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7.
11
7.
12
7.
13
7.
10
28
.9
38
.1
48
.
58
.
68
.
78
.
88
.
98
.
10
8.
11
8.
12
8.
13
8.
11
29
.8
39
.1
49
.
59
.
69
.
79
.
89
.
99
.
10
9.
11
9.
12
9.
13
9.
12
30
.6
40
.1
5
0
.
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.
70
.
80
.
90
.
10
0.
11
0.
12
0.
13
0.
13
9.
9
13
31
.5
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.
51
.
61
.
71
.
81
.
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.
10
1.
11
0.
9
12
0.
8
13
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5
13
9.
3
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.4
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.
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.
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.
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.
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.
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8
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4
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0.
1
12
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6
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.
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.9
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.8
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.4
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9
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7.
1
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5
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11
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34
.3
44
.
53
.9
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.8
73
.3
81
.7
87
.6
90
.7
92
.2
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.2
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.8
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.9
17
35
.1
44
.6
54
.1
62
.4
68
.
70
.9
72
.4
74
.4
75
.9
77
.
77
.6
78
.
18
33
.8
41
.8
48
.
51
.
52
.6
54
.5
56
.1
57
.
57
.7
58
.1
58
.4
58
.6
19
23
.
28
.2
32
.2
34
.7
36
.2
37
.1
37
.7
38
.1
38
.4
38
.6
38
.8
40
.
20
13
.
15
.
16
.3
17
.2
17
.7
18
.1
18
.4
18
.6
18
.9
20
.
20
.
20
.
U
i
78
70
61
51
41
31
21
11
1
-9
-1
9
-2
9
Π
s
15
45
15
45
16
75
18
75
19
83
19
73
19
63
19
53
19
43
19
33
19
23
19
13
C
20
60
20
60
20
60
20
60
20
33
20
23
20
13
20
03
19
93
19
83
19
73
19
63
33
Table 5: Outcome for supplier when the manufacturer applies trembling-
hand strategies.
Outcome State
Carrier
n u + a - A State 1
(k − 1)u−A− as + (n− k)max(u, us) State 2
(k − 1)us − as + (n− k + 1)u−A State 3
nus − as No contract
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